have shown that experiences within the financial sector tend to induce a FOMC member to dissent on the tightening side while an NGO career is associated with somewhat more frequent "loosing" dissents.
2 Political connections also are to be considered, as FOMC members appointed by a Democratic president seem to be more "dovish", according to studies by, e.g., Gildea (1991, 1995) , Chappell et al. (1993 Chappell et al. ( , 1995 , Tootell (1996) , Chang (2003) or Meade and Sheets (2005) .
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The obvious difficulty is that, if such a background influence exists, it has to be disentangled from other sources of disagreement or heterogeneity that may hamper the considerations are also noticeable in Presidents' public speeches (Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2013 ), a result that confirms the more general case of regional favoritism made by Hodler and Raschky (2014). Thus, it seems interesting to identify also the strength of regional influences on the members of the Board of Governors.
In this paper, we thus investigate both the regional and background determinants of the FOMC members' propensity to disagree, to disentangle their relative effects. So doing, one faces, however, a number of difficulties. First, as the Reserve Banks regions do not coincide with the ones of the American States, nor with the Census regions, some data are not available at the adequate level (i.e., the one of the Reserve Banks' districts).
As this may have blurred the previous analyses, we choose to build new relevant data at 4 This behavior is also indirectly confirmed by higher preferred policy rates at the end of the tenure of Presidents (both voting and non-voting), when the incentives for consensuality tend to fade and, thus, the temptation to reveal the true preferences is less constrained (Johnson et al., 2012) . 5 The minutes of the FOMC meetings are not a useful source of information here, due to their brevity and absence of attribution of the elements of discussions whereas, as stated by Meade (2010) : "the published transcripts provide a relatively complete account of FOMC meetings. The transcripts are, for the most part, verbatim, although they have been lightly edited to provide clarification (when necessary) and to excise discussion of specific sources (when release of this information could undermine the FOMC's access to information)" [provided by foreign central banks and governments].
transcripts to derive the preferences of each voting member of the FOMC. Third, we compute Taylor rules-based desired rates for each member. Fourth, we estimate the impact of the FOMC members' background on their preferences, to assess how backgrounds shape preferences.
Our study thus adds at least two contributions to the field. First, it analyzes the influence of FOMC members' local areas key economic variables on their preferred monetary policy. Standardly assuming that FOMC members (at least implicitly) follow a Taylorlike reaction function when deciding on the interest rate, we expect different evolutions of the local economic indicators -i.e., inflation and output -to induce different policy preferences. Second, it points out which personal characteristics of FOMC members tend to increase or decrease the degree of disagreement inside the Committee. Hence, we separate out two effects which are generally confounded in the literature, either because the authors searched for regional economic influences without considering background effects or, on the opposite, were looking for background effects without controlling for regional developments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first expose the methodology we have used, before analyzing the results of our empirical estimates, while the concluding section summarizes the findings. Finally, it is also quite standard to augment the traditional Taylor rule with a "smoothing" parameter to make it correspond even more to the observed pattern of interest rates (Woodford, 2003) . However, individuals have much less incentives than institutions to smooth their behavior. As a consequence, it makes sense to assume that individual decision makers do not smooth their desired interest rates. 6 Moreover, it has been demonstrated, by, e.g., Farvaque et al. (2009) , that (at least part of) the smoothing behavior is a product of the nature of monetary policy making by committee itself. Hence, everything happens as if the meeting is a two-stage process, with individuals first stating their preferences and then the committee deciding upon the common policy rate. This was for instance the case during the Greenspan era, during which the discussion on interest rates at FOMC meetings occurred in two rounds. The first round served mainly to exchange views between members on the economic situation. The second round was devoted to the discussion of policy options. This was the occasion for Chairman Greenspan to provide his views and policy recommendations, generally followed by the rest of the members. as useful as may have seemed for our purpose. We thus follow this literature and consider that FOMC members may react to changes in the inflation rate, the industrial production index, and the unemployment rate of their respective districts.
Data issues
The real issue however lies in computing data consistent with the districts monitored 7 Renshon (2009) provides a further argument of the validity of using public speeches for assessing leaders' beliefs, showing that the analysis of public sources lead to the same outcomes as private sources. 8 As the Fed itself acknowledges, before 1994, the Transcripts are not real transcripts, which limits the information they convey. And the transcripts are not yet available after 2008. Such a lag explains why they have not so often been used. However, their richness compensates for the potential drawback related to the fact that coding them to get the preference of a member is a sometimes relatively subjective process, when members do not state explicitly their favorite option (see Chappell 
Estimating individual Taylor-like reaction functions using regional data
The dependent variable we consider is the preferred policy rate expressed by the central banker when he/she votes during the period 1994-2008, i p t , while the independent variables include the consumer price index, a measure of the relative regional economic position (corresponding to the difference between the regional Coincident index and the national one, which we hereafter call for expositional simplicity the regional cycle gap), and the unemployment rate in his/her district. We choose not to include the national inflation and unemployment rates in ordre to avoid multicollinearity with the rest of the dependent variables.
We check whether there is correlation between the CPI, the regional cycle gap, and the unemployment rate, and find no evidence for correlation 10 . We use the heteroskedasticityconsistent estimator (HCE) to control for potential heteroskedasticity, as in Jung (2013).
We present the results of the estimated reaction functions for the Federal Reserve districts in the form of individual Taylor 
where π d,t is the (district-based) measure of inflation in the observed district, and y d,t
and u d,t are, respectively, the regional cycle gap and unemployment in the same district.
Note also that the time index, t designates the voting period of each central banker.
Then, t will cover all the meetings during which a FOMC member has voted, like, for frequency, we average the monthly macroeconomic records between the second and the fourth meeting. We obtain a set of estimated parameters ĉ,β,γ,δ for each central banker, which reflects the reaction of each FOMC member for a change in the inflation rate, the industrial index and the unemployment rate of his/her district during his/her voting period. Table 1 presents the results of the estimates of equation (1) for each FOMC member.
10 Even though the coincident index is constructed using employment related data, there is no risk of doubling up the predictors when we include it in the regression. We check for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and find no correlation between the dependent variables. We also drop the coincident term from the estimation and find that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent. Alternative results available upon request. Several results are worth highlighting here. First, there does not seem to be strong differences in the reaction functions of Presidents and Governors. President Gary Stern is a case in point, here, as all the (district-based) variables are strongly significant in his case while, on average, the district-based CPI measure does not seem to influence FOMC members. Second, in the case of output, our regional measure influences both the Presidents and the Governors, confirming the relevance of considering both types of policymakers. Third, the unemployment variable has the expected sign: an increase in the unemployment rate is related to a decrease in the preferred rate 11 . The estimates in with the previous ones is not obvious (given the sample and data building differences), our results deliver a ranking -in terms of degree of relative hawkishness -of the districts that is almost similar to the one that can be derived from Jung (2013 , Table 3 ). Both types of support thus allow us to pursue our investigation.
In a second step, we use the estimated parameters ĉ,β,γ,δ , along with ex-post regional data, to derive the "desired" interest rate for each FOMC member j, i j,t for the full period for which Transcripts are available (i.e., 1994-2008):
where t = 1994Meet1-2008Meet8.
We then derive the difference between the desired interest rate, i j,t , and the Fed's actually decided interest rate, i t , for the period 1994-2008. This difference, P D j,t , is thus a measure of the "policy differential" between what the situation of his/her district would have induced a FOMC member j to aim at and the policy implemented during the FOMC meeting. Table A .2 in the Appendix delivers the descriptive statistics of the desired interest rate and of the "policy differential" for the FOMC members during the period under review.
11 Except for Janet Yellen and Alice Rivlin.
Measuring personal backgrounds' influence
In the final step, we assess how much the "policy differential" is related to the biographical data of FOMC members. As explained above, the aim is to assess the influence of the personal characteristics of monetary policy makers on their respective desired interest rate with respect to the actual one, having purged for any regional bias they are also displaying.
The use of the difference P D j,t allows to reveal the impact of FOMC members' biographical features on their propensity of being more hawkish (if, on average, P D j,t ≥ 0), or more dovish (if, on average, P D j,t ≤ 0) than the rest of the committee members. P D j,t = c 0 +αP rof j +λEduc j +ρW oman j +φM ember j +υBernanke t +τ X t +D 1j,t +D 2j,t +µ j,t
where t = 1994Meet1-2008Meet8, c 0 is a constant, P rof j and Educ j indicate, respectively, the career and the educational background of the FOMC member, while M ember j is a dummy variable indicating whether the voting member is a Board member or a Bank president, also controlling for the fact that a member has been appointed by a Democrat or Republican administration. The meaning of the dummy W oman j is self-explaining, as well as the Bernanke t one 13 . Finally, X t is the vector of national macroeconomic 12 Additionally, this can disclose the determinants of their influence on the decision-making process of the FOMC: given that this influence may have an impact on the value of P D j,t , then, the more influential a FOMC member is, the more P D j,t should be close to 0. However, as other factors may influence the value of P D j,t , such as the regional business cycle positioning with respect to the national one, we do not pursue this avenue further. 13 The importance of chairman for the outcomes of a monetary policy committee was highlighted, e.g., variables, D 1j,t and D 2j,t are dummy variables that take the value 1 if, respectively, the regional unemployment rate is higher than the national one, and the national unemployment rate is higher than the NAIRU. This specification allows the regression to be cleanly indicative of regional influences.
We consider five indicators (dummy variables) for the professional experience: fi- The first regression in Table 2 includes all the variables, while the two following ones intend to check for potential multicollinearity between the biographical data (notably between some educational and professional background indicators). The dependent variable is the policy differential variable, P D, in the first three estimates displayed in Table 2, while the last two ones present estimates for the positive (resp., negative) values of the policy differential. So doing should allow differentiating the influence different types of backgrounds have on a (relative) tendency to disagree on the policy decisions, and the incentive to disagree when the difference between the desired interest rate and the actual one is positive or negative (which would, respectively, signal a degree of hawkishness or dovishness).
As can be seen from Table 2 14 , for example, it appears that a background as Professor tends to be associated with a propensity to disagree on the dovish side, as the policy differential is significantly related to this category (column (1)). Even more interestingly, as can be seen from column (4), the propensity to disagree is more significant in case of a
by Claussen et al. (2012).
14 Given the low number of observations for some central bankers in the first step (i.e., the estimation of the individual reaction functions), like e.g. for Richard Fisher, we have re-estimated eq. (3) using only the desired interest rates of central bankers with a number of observations superior to the median. This delivers results qualitatively similar as the ones displayed in Table 2 (available upon request).
negative differential than in case of a positive one. Hence, this signals a greater dovishness of Professors (relatively to the reference category). Another interesting result holds for MBA holders, who would tend to be more hawkish when the differential is positive, and more dovish when the differential is negative.
Members of the FOMC with experiences in the private or the public sector appear to have a propensity to disagree on the dovish side (with regard to the reference category, i.e., members coming from the financial sector), as their background is negatively related to the policy differential, whatever the sign of this differential. This result is in accordance with the findings of Chappell et al. (1995) and Eichler and Lahner (2014a) .
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Members with a previous experience at the Federal Reserve seem also to be more accommodative through their expressed preferences. The inverse stands for female members of the FOMC, for whom the same pattern is observed, but with the opposite sign for the coefficients. This is in line with previous results on a larger degree of hawkishness from women. This is explained by the fact that women tend, on average, to be more conservative in their monetary policy preferences -possibly in order to establish a reputation -, as exposed in Farvaque et al. (2011 Farvaque et al. ( , 2014 . 16 Members of the Board appointed by a Republican administration tend to be on the dovish side, as a negative sign of the coefficient is associated with the policy differential (interestingly, the results also show that this tendency is even higher when the differential is positive, thus signalling a reduced degree of hawkishness). On this point at least, our results contrast with the general finding of the literature (from at least Havrilesky and Gildea, 1991 Finally, the period associated with the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke is associated with a relatively high degree of disagreement, which could mean that the FOMC, under his 15 Relating this result to the one by Eichler and Lähner (2014a) is not immediate, though, as they focus on dissent while we identify a propensity to disagree. Nevertheless, as they show that FOMC members with longer careers in the public sector are more focused on output stabilization, which can be considered as a sign of dovishness, our results refine and complement their previous one. 16 Although the number of women in the sample is quite small (5), the effect is a real "gender effect", and not a "Yellen effect", for instance. chairmanship, has become more "individualistic" (see Meade, 2005 , or Blinder, 2007 .
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This can be indirectly confirmed by the increased frequency of dissenting votes in early years of his mandate (especially 2008, see Thornton and Wheelock, 2014) . Of course, this can also be related to the period of the financial crisis, characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and thereby during which members exhibited more disagreement as to the nature of the data, understandings of the transmission mechanism, and so on.
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Our results thus clearly reveal that there are some influences from FOMC members' backgrounds on their distance between the policy they would favor as representative of their district and the policy implemented by the Federal Reserve. Moreover, our procedure reveals that background influence go beyond the regional bias, and that both have to be taken into account.
It is also worth noting that the macroeconomic variables are strongly significant, in the three regressions. And the coefficient of "Dummy Unemployment" has the expected sign and is strongly significant, thus showing that in case of a positive differencial between the regional unemployment rate and the national one, a FOMC member tends to disagree on the dovish side, as shown also in Meade and Sheets (2005). 17 As stated by Belden (1989) : "differences in the voting records during different chairmanships may reflect differences in the ability of the chairman to exercise control over the other members of the FOMC".
18 Belden (1989) : "A volatile economic environment and uncertainty about the impact of policy actions on monetary aggregates and changes in velocity may heighten dissent". To test whether our results are sensitive to the step corresponding to the computation of the desired interest rates for FOMC members, we skip the estimation of eq. (2), and consider in a simultaneous regression eqs. (1) and (3). Hence, we regress the monetary policy preferences of FOMC members directly on their regional and biographical data, to check whether we obtain results consistent with those reported in Table 2 . If, by definition, this procedure does not allow to estimate the variation in individual reaction functions among FOMC members as shown in Table 1 , it nevertheless permits checking the influence of the regional economic conditions when one wishes to reveal the background effect on FOMC members' preferred policy rates.
We thus run the following panel regression, using OLS with robust standard errors: i p j,t = c + η j + βπ j,t + γy j,t + δu j,t + αP rof j + λEduc j + ρW oman j + φM ember j + υBernanke t + τ X t + µ j,t (4)
On the left hand side, i p j,t represents the preferred policy rate of central banker j during his/her voting period. The right hand-side variables have similar meanings as in the previous regressions (see equations 1 and 3). The additional element, η j , represents individual fixed effects. We do not include the national inflation and unemployment rates, as the correlation matrix shows that the null hypothesis of no correlation cannot be rejected with the regional inflation and unemployment rates. Table 3 displays the results of the estimation. Board Rep. As shown in Table 3 , and consistently with detailed individual results presented in Table 1 , the regional cycle gap and the regional unemployment exert a significant influence on the preferred policy rates of the FOMC members. Analogically with the results provided above, they also collectively care about the national growth rate. The sign of the coefficients lies in conformity with what could be expected, i.e., the coefficient linked to the regional unemployment rate and the NAIRU dummy are negative and significant (the higher the regional unemployment rate or the NAIRU, the lower the FOMC member's preferred policy rate).
The results for educational categories are globally consistent with our main empirical strategy: Professors, Masters and Bachelors are more dovish than the reference category of PhD holders. The only different result is for the category of MBA holders: here they appear to be more hawkish than the reference category (as in Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007) , whereas the global result reported in column (1) of Table 2 suggests a higher propensity to be consensual. However, already in column (4) of Table 2 (regression run on positive policy differentials), they were preferring even higher policy rates. This drop of ambiguity suggests that the propensity of MBA holders to disagree is especially visible if they are on the hawkish side of the committee.
The robustness check for professional categories confirms the dovish character of central bankers as well as private and public sector representants as compared to the reference category (of decision-makers issued from the financial sector). The only tiny difference is related to the fact that the results reported in Table 3 now suggest a significant hawkishness of members from the academia.
However, the robustness check indicates rather hawkish than dovish side of disagreement over the policy rate under the Chairman Bernanke. This reveals the interest of our policy differential measure, which delivers finer insights into the dynamics at play inside the FOMC. Nevertheless, qualitative results for the Board members nominated by the Republican and Democratic Presidents, and for the women, are consistent with those reported above and even more pronounced (both in terms of value and significance), and the value of the F-test confirms that there is no behavioral differences between bank Presidents and Governors.
Using monetary policy voting records instead of monetary policy preferences
As emphasized in section 2.2., FOMC transcripts are supposed to reveal the policy preferences of FOMC members. Thus, one might expect different results in Table 2 if we use the voted policy rates rather than the expressed policy rates, i.e., a different influence of FOMC members' background characteristics on their policy differential. To show whether this is the case, we re-estimate equation (1) In the second step, we use the estimated parameters to re-estimate equation 2 and 3 using similar right hand-side variable, the only difference being the value of the new coefficients that are used to compute the desired interest rates. Given that we use votes instead of the stated preferences, we also add a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
there was a dissent vote in the policy meeting, and 0 otherwise. Table 4 displays the results of estimation (3) with votes as the dependent variables, instead of the preferred policy rates from FOMC transcripts. A first remarkable difference concerns a stronger significance (and higher value) of the constant in the robustness check, which arguably means that our main method of investigation is better able to dismantle the "constant" value into the true preferences and their regional determinants.
Otherwise, similarly to the first results, academic members of the FOMC are not significantly different from the reference category. Overall, the significance and the value of the coefficients are stronger when we use the policy preferences revealed by the transcripts than preferences revealed by votes. This is notably reflected on the degree of hawkishness of MBA holders in case of a positive differential, and on members of central bank staff and woman in case of a negative policy differential. Republican governors seem to behave more dovishly when expressing their policy preferences than when voting, in case 19 Test results available upon request.
of a negative differential. Finally, the coefficients attached to the dissent dummy lie in conformity with the analysis of Thornton and Wheelock (2014) , that dissents are not necessarily correlated with macroeconomic variables, but with fundamental disagreement about the policy stance. The significance and sign of the dummy attached to the expression of dissent also tend to signal the presence of strategic voting, and thus reinforces the advantage of using the transcripts instead of the votes.
Therefore, it must be underlined that using the preferences decoded from the transcripts provide better, and more sincere, results for showing FOMC members' background influence on their policy preferences. The results also indicate that professional backgrounds matter for policy preferences and for the propensity to disagree. We document that both a private and a public sector experience, as well as the fact of being a former central bank staff member is associated with disagreement on the dovish side (although for the latter category the effect seems somewhat smaller quantitatively), as compared to the reference category (financial sector). As for the educational levels, all (Bachelors, Masters, Professors and MBA holders) seem to be more dovish than the reference category of PhD holders, the effect being strongest for Bachelors and Masters, whereas MBA holders are revealed as the most reactive. Interestingly, we show that governors nominated by a Republican president tend to disagree on the dovish side, whereas those appointed by a Democrat do it on the hawkish one. Women are consistently shown to have a higher propensity to disagree on the hawkish side.
Finally, we also show that under the chairmanship of Bernanke, the incentives to disagree seem to have increased for all types of members. This may have strenghtened the propensity to disagree that was arising from regional developments, as well as from the idiosyncrasies of the previous experiences (professional and educational) members of the FOMC carry when seating in the meetings. The results are robust to alternative estimation strategies and the use of votes instead of transcripts. Overall, the paper delivers new insights on the inside of the FOMC in both the Greenspan and Bernanke years, and notably confirms the interest of using Transcripts instead of expressed votes to study policy preferences. 
